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THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
& ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE RELATIONS
STEPHEN WOOLCOCK
* *
ABSTRACT
Although elements of precaution were used in the environmental regulation of
various countries in the 1970s, including the United States, it has been the
European Union that has emerged as the main proponent of the precautionary
principle, both in European regulatory policy and in international agreements.
The precautionary principle must be considered as an important and enduring
feature of European and increasingly international policies aimed at dealing with
the risk to the environment as well as human, plant and animal health in instances
where the level of risk is not insignificant and where there is scientific uncertainty.
Developed and applied originally in the field of environmental regulation, the
precautionary principle has subsequently found application in other related policy
fields such as human health, and is becoming an acceptable feature of – if not
customary – international law.
Rightly or wrongly, the precautionary principle is also wrapped up in the current
critique of “globalisation”, because it promises wider, more democratic
participation in decision-making concerning issues of central importance to the
sustainability and risks associated with economic and technological development.
Precaution provides those sceptical of established policy-making procedures
with a case for opening the policy process to wider participation and greater
transparency and democratic accountability.
The central issue with regard to the EU’s application of the precautionary
principle is whether it will form the basis for balanced policy that promotes
sustainability and facilitates the growth of trade and investment. Or will it be used
in an arbitrary fashion and simply wheeled out to justify controls on trade or
investment that are dictated by commercial or political expediency?
Most of the concern expressed about EU policy relates to a number of trade
disputes involving the United States. These include, in particular, the beef
hormones case on which the WTO ruled against the EU ban on the grounds that
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it was inconsistent with Article 5(7) of the Agreements on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures. Precautionary measures taken by the EU were found to
be inconsistent with the SPS agreement, which only allows for provisional
measures based on precaution. The second case concerns genetically modified
products where measures – taken by EU member states and the EU as a whole
on the basis of precaution have also been challenged by the EU’s trading
partners. The EU’s policy in these cases has not only been inconsistent with
existing trade rules but also inconsistent in its application.
This inconsistency must be seen as a result of political expediency in the face of
intense domestic pressure for a higher degree of precaution in risk management
following a number of failures to provide sufficient protection for consumers and
the environment. The latest and most significant failure concerned BSE (mad
cow disease) where regulators withheld information on risk from consumers for
largely commercial reasons, but the European Environment Agency has recently
published a report listing a series of failures to protect the environment or human
health over a period of the last 100 years.
The EU member states and European institutions have recognised the need to
develop a clear and consistent approach to the use of the precautionary principle.
This has resulted in a clearer statement on its application in the 2000 European
Commission paper, which has subsequently been endorsed by member states
and the European Parliament and in the revised food safety regime currently
being implemented in the EU.
The European Union’s motivation in pressing for the application of the
precautionary principle in international trade and environmental agreements
therefore results from the fact that the precautionary principle has been
established as the guiding principle for environmental and food safety regulation
within the EU. This is firmly anchored in treaty provisions introduced in 1991,
and in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. This establishment of
the precautionary principle has come about because of the political pressure from
consumers and voters who lack confidence in the existing regulatory regimes and
are sceptical of the ability of science to find all the answers. It is therefore
inaccurate and superficial to characterise the EU’s insistence on the acceptance
of the precautionary principle as a cover for protection. Trade issues arise
because Europeans are demanding a higher degree of precaution than has been
accepted by other governments.
The EU’s insistence on the precautionary principle has also been characterised as
a rejection of “sound science”. This is also inaccurate or at least only part of the
story. The EU’s approach to risk analysis is not anti-science; rather, it argues that
risk assessment should be science-based. The EU approach does, however,THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
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place scientific risk assessment within a broader framework which also includes
non-scientific value judgements of what is an acceptable risk for society. There is
a widespread acceptance of scientific uncertainty in risk assessment and
management. For this reason, the vast majority of countries accept the need for
precaution as a legitimate element in risk analysis. This is, for example, reflected
in its inclusion of a range of multilateral environmental agreements in the SPS
agreement and in the current discussions on Principles of Risk Analysis in the
Codex Alimentarius. Differences arise not over the use, but rather the degree of
precaution, and how to ensure that the inevitable regulatory discretion associated
with the use of precaution is not used to limit trade “unfairly”.
Given the differences between public policy preferences between countries and
regions, it is always going to be difficult to reach consensus on international
standards governing what is acceptable risk. It is worth noting that  standards-
setting is as much a political as a scientific process with votes in the various
relevant fora, such as Codex Committees, deciding on acceptable levels. Whilst
there remains a need to continue work on international agreement on standards,
the more likely policy approach to resolving tensions is agreeing on procedural
criteria for the application of precaution. Such procedural criteria can help to
ensure that discretion is not abused. This is the approach recommended in the
recent draft on Principles for Risk Analysis within the context of work on the
Codex Alimentarius. The proposed criteria include, for example, the requirement
to continue efforts to improve scientific knowledge of the risks involved,
proportionality, transparency, consistency, non-discrimination, the use of cost-
benefit analysis and provision for reviews of risk-assessment decisions and
measures taken to mitigate risk. These criteria have already found expression in
the EU’s policy guidelines and in other policy applications, such as in the new
regulations on EU food safety.
One important difference between the EU and other countries is that the EU
wishes to see “the” precautionary principle recognised in a wide range of
international environmental and trade agreements. Other governments oppose this
on the grounds that the international legal precedent that exists in environmental
regulation is inappropriate for other policy fields. In other words, the EU wants
“the” precautionary principle to cover all types of risk (environmental, food and
animal health, etc.). This is consistent with EU practice. Other governments want
to tailor the application of a precautionary approach to the specific policy area or
risk.
Disputes between the EU and its trading partners over the application of the
precautionary principle seem likely to continue and could become much more
serious, if, for example, there is a WTO case brought over EU bans – or labellingSTEPHEN WOOLCOCK
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– of genetically modified products.  The EU ban is influenced by genuine
consumer and environmental concerns. They are not simply disguised protection.
The EU’s trading partners have equally deep-seated but divergent views on how
to deal with risk and what role precaution should play in regulation. These
divergent views have developed over a period of time and can be said to be
structural in nature. The WTO dispute settlement will not be able to resolve
problems created by such structural differences. What is needed is a wider
international debate on the role of precaution with a view to finding some agreed
procedural criteria or guidelines on how precaution should be applied.1
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
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1. Introduction
This paper discusses the European approach to the precautionary principle and
how this impinges on international trade relations. It starts by illustrating how the
concept of the precautionary principle was developed in the European Union
from the late 1970s onwards. Although the US and other countries have had
elements of precaution in their environmental regulation, it is the EU that has
developed and is promoting the wider application of “the precautionary
principle” in international agreements.
1
The paper then unpacks the elements that go to make up the precautionary
principle in order to help understand what is involved. This shows that the
application of the precautionary principle rests on three core conditions: a)
regulatory non-action threatens to lead to non-negligible harm; b) there is a lack
of certainty as to the cause and effects relationship; and that c) under such
circumstances, regulatory inaction is not justified. In addition to these core
conditions, there is a range of other elements that are associated with the use of
the principle.
The paper illustrates how the precautionary principle has become a central feature
of EU policy not just in the field of environmental regulation but also more
recently in the field of human health/food safety. This fact, together with the rapid
application of the precautionary principle in a range of regional, bilateral and
multilateral agreements, means that like it or not a precautionary approach, if not
“the” precautionary principle is here to stay.
Attention then turns to how differences over the application of a precautionary
approach/principle can create difficulties in the international trading system and
trade relations. The paper discusses the examples of the WTO (agreements on
the Application of Sanitary and  Phytosanitary Measures and the Technical
Barriers to Trade), the Bio-safety Convention, and current work in the Codex
Alimentarius.
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2. The Origins of the Precautionary Principle
Although elements of precaution can be found in the US and British
environmental regulation in the 1970s, it has been the European Union that has
emerged as the main proponent of the principle since the 1980s. Indeed, having
provided the model for early European environmental regulation, the United
States now finds itself in the position of trying to resist European pressure to
apply the precautionary principle in international agreements. The application of
the precautionary principle in the  Biosafety Protocol
2 and the EU’s use of
precaution as grounds for regulating and limiting the importation of genetically
modified crops
3 are two recent examples of such tensions.
There are a number of reasons why the precautionary principle has assumed an
important role in both domestic and international policy and why it is here to
stay. The first is that the EU, as a major player in international trade and
environmental regime formation has adopted the approach in its risk analysis and
is championing its use in international agreements. In the late 1970s and early
1980s it was the Federal Republic of Germany that played an important role in
developing and promoting the use of the precautionary principle within the EU.
Germany policy was driven by a deep-seated concern about the impact of acid
rain on its forests, global warming and the pollution of the North Sea. At that time
there was no scientific consensus on the impact of acid rain on the environment.
Sweden had thrust acid rain onto the agenda at the UN Environment Conference
in Stockholm in 1972. The Long Range Transport of Air Pollutants (LRTAP)
study had linked acidification in Scandinavia with sulphur dioxide (SO2)
emissions, but the link was still contested within the scientific community in part
due to firm resistance from countries, such as the United Kingdom, to any
regulation requiring expensive flue gas cleaning of major SO2 polluters. The
German philosophy at the time was summed up in the 1976 Environment Report
of the Federal Government:
Environmental policy is not fully accomplished by warding off
imminent hazards and the elimination of damage that has occurred.
Precautionary environmental policy requires furthermore that natural
resources are protected and demands on them are made with care.
4
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The precautionary principle was therefore used in support of tough regulations
requiring expensive de-sulphurisation practices, because although trees were
dying there was at that time no clear causal link to SO2 emissions. Once these
measures had been introduced in national regulation, Germany industry joined
with environmental groups and other NGOs in pressing for the introduction of
controls across Europe. Similarly tough environmental regulations were applied
to address CO2 emissions and the pollution of the North Sea through the
dumping of sewage sludge containing heavy metals.
The German approach to precaution was a pretty robust one as indicated in the
Federal German government’s report on environmental policy in 1984:
The principle of precaution (Vorsorge) commands that damages done
to the natural world…should be avoided in advance and in accordance
with opportunity and possibility. Precaution further means the early
detection of dangers to health and the environment by comprehensive,
synchronised… research… [It] also means acting when conclusively
ascertained understandings by science is not yet available.
5
A broad consensus, at least on the use of precaution in environmental policy,
appears to have developed in Germany, despite the fact that this resulted in
increased costs for industry. Support for the approach and tough environmental
regulation per se was probably German industry making virtue out of necessity.
German industry was willing to accept that it had little option but to embrace
improved environmental standards and that in doing so it could strengthen its
international competitive position by being first to develop more environmentally
sustainable technologies. This consensus on the need to adopt more
environmentally sustainable technologies and production has been called
“ecological modernisation”. In other words the potential conflict between growth
and environmental aims was overcome through support for modernisation that
would replace old polluting technologies and products with new ones and thus
promote growth whilst improving the environment. It is not clear what link there
is between ecological modernisation and the precautionary principle. The
introduction of less polluting technologies can clearly be encouraged by
regulation aimed at minimising or preventing known risk. In Europe there is
concern that an excessive degree of precaution will have a chilling effect on
investment in new technologies. This is particularly the case with biotechnology.
Throughout the 1980s the European Union moved progressively towards tougher
environmental protection and a wider application of the precautionary principle.
                                                                
5 See Albert Weale, The New Politics of Pollution, Manchester University Press, 1992.STEPHEN WOOLCOCK
4
In this Germany was a leading proponent, but there was growing support among
other member states of the EU that were equally influenced by the strength of the
environmental arguments shaped by effective environmental NGO lobbying.
Some countries resisted the trend for reasons of principle and expediency.
Environment policy in Britain was – and to a lesser degree continues to be –
more influenced by sound science, and during the 1980s the British government
resisted tougher EU environmental regulation of S02 emissions and the dumping
of sewage sludge in order to keep the costs for UK industry down. The case was
even made that the winds and tides that prevailed in British weather patterns
resulted in easy natural dispersal of pollution and thus gave British industry a
comparative advantage compared to industrial locations such as the Rhine valley
where natural dispersal was slow. Although Britain was able to delay the
introduction of tougher environmental regulation it was not able to stop the trend
in EU policy. Subsequently British policy has also shifted towards more
environmentally friendly policies, but it still includes a more ready acceptance of
cost benefit analysis as a factor in shaping regulatory policy more than is the case
in other EU member states like Germany. The 1999 statement by the new Labour
Government on the precautionary principle illustrates how the British position has
moved towards the EU consensus:
The precautionary principle means that it is not acceptable just to say
“we can’t be sure that serious damage will happen, so we’ll do nothing
to prevent it”. Precaution is not just relevant to environmental damage
– for example, chemicals, which may affect wildlife may also affect
human health. At the same time precautionary action must be based on
objective assessments of the costs and benefits of action. The
principle does not mean that we only permit activities if we are sure
that serious harm will not arise, or there is proof that the benefits will
outweigh the possible risks… There are no hard and fast rules on when
to take action: each case has to be considered carefully... transparency
is essential... Decisions should be reviewed to reflect better of risk as
more evidence becomes available (DETR, 1999, quoted in
O’Riordan).
The shift in UK policy is also symptomatic of the progressive application of the
precautionary principle in the EU during the 1980s and 1990s. The first piece of
EU legislation adopting the precautionary principle was the 1979 Directive on the
testing of new chemicals. But this has been followed by many more applications
of precaution in the total of 500 pieces of legislation in the field of the
environment up to 2000 ( Haig, 2000). Paradoxically, the model used for the
Directive on new chemicals in 1979 was US legislation, but by the 1990s the EU
was ahead of the US in its application of the precautionary principle. TheTHE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
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Maastricht Treaty revision of the founding treaty of the EU enshrined
environmental protection, including the use of the precautionary principle as one
of the central policy objectives of the EU. See below.
A second reason why the precautionary principle has been brought to the
forefront of debate in recent years has been the steady extension of the use of the
principle from the environment into other related policy fields such as human,
animal and plant health. This wider use of the precautionary principle has gone
hand in hand with the general trend towards a convergence of environmental
regulation and other policy areas, such as trade policy, as the aim of integrating
environmental objectives into other policies domains became more and more
accepted. In this respect the EU position has tended to be to seek to establish
that “the” precautionary principle shall be applied in all instances, whereas the
governments of other countries, such as the United States, appear to wish to
tailor the use of precaution to the specific policy area.
The link with food safety and trade has in particular, thrown up cases such as the
beef hormones, when the EU introduced a ban on certain hormones in beef in
1988 on the grounds that these could be carcinogenic. In 1998 the EU also
banned the use of four antibiotics in animal feed (virginiamycin, bacitracin zinc,
tylosin phosphate and spiramycin) on the grounds that such use of antibiotics
risked promoting resistance to antibiotics in humans and thus reducing their
effectiveness. Finally, a number of EU member states have banned to sale of
certain genetically modified crops and the EU suspended further approvals of
GM products and proposed mandatory labelling of GM products in food, on the
grounds that genetically modified products represent a risk to the environment
and consumers.
6 The GM cases concern a significant volume of trade and could
create very serious trade tensions between the EU and the major agricultural
exporters including in particular the United States. In all cases precaution has
played a role in the sense that the level of risk and how such risk should be
managed has been an issue of contention.
Animal rights issues or broader ethical issues related to, for example, the use of
human genetics seem likely to be further areas in which the precautionary
principle will find application. Developments in science continue to offer new
technologies and new products with significant benefits but also a potential
impact on the environment and human health. At the same time, there remains, as
in the past, a level of uncertainty about the impact of these products. This,
combined with the links between environmental policy and other policy areas,
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such as in the case of the treatment of GMOs, seems likely to ensure that there
will be continued pressure for methods developed in environmental policy such
as the precautionary principle to be applied in other policy areas.
A third reason why precaution has been brought to the fore in recent years is that
it is wrapped up in the debate on sustainability. Sustainability must be seen as a
wider concept than environmental protection and one that involves a politicisation
of decision-making in the fields of environmental regulation, food safety and
other issues linked to sustainable production and consumption. Sustainability is
in turn linked to a wider agenda concerning the participation of consumers, the
public and above all civil society NGOs in the decision-making processes. The
desire for sustainable development reflects a deep scepticism that science has all
the answers and thus a suspicion of decisions on risk assessment or risk
management based on “sound science”. The case is made that science-based
decisions are not without normative biases and that as a result the assessment of
risk should be open to wider participation, so that societal norms and values can
be integrated into the risk assessment process.
There is also a suspicion of the risk management decisions taken by regulatory
agencies or governments. Established channels of decision-making have been
challenged as unaccountable. Experiences such as with the handling of the BSE
issue in Britain and elsewhere have at best shown that regulators and politicians
have not reflected public concern about the potential impact and at worst that
regulators and politicians sought to keep information about risk from the public
for reasons of commercial interest of producers. Episodes such as the BSE
fiasco have therefore led to a fundamental undermining of public confidence in
the established – predominantly science-based – risk assessment and
management procedures within Europe. There has therefore been increasing
pressure for greater transparency and decision-making and for greater
participation in the decision-making process. Conventional democratic channels
are rejected in favour of activism by a range of civil society  NGOs, including
consumers and other  groups, but especially environmental  NGOs. As the
definition or application of the precautionary principle is inevitably political, these
pressures for wider participation will have a bearing on its application.
3. The Concept of the Precautionary Principle
Before going any further it is important to have a clearer idea of what the
precautionary principle is. This section discusses the various elements that make
up the precautionary principle. From the outset it should be pointed out that
discussing the elements does not get us anywhere nearer an operational criteria
for determining non-negligible risk and thus justifying regulatory intervention. Nor
will this discussion provide answers to the question of what degree ofTHE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
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intervention is needed. But a greater understanding of what are generally seen to
be elements of the precautionary principle should help us understand it better,
even if it results in a more sophisticated level of confusion.
The essence of the precautionary principle is that it provides “the philosophical
authority in a rational yet chaotic age to take public policy or regulatory decisions
about the protection of the environment or human health in the face of scientific
uncertainty, or worse, ignorance”.
7 Alternatively, the precautionary principle
provides the basis for “acting in advance of scientific proof of harm to address
uncertain but potentially significant risks”.
8 The precautionary principle involves
some shifting of the balance in the debate about regulatory intervention away
from inaction to action by regulators in the face of a lack of reasonably
convincing scientific evidence. This is best illustrated by Cameron’s broad
definition that the precautionary principle “stipulates that where the environmental
[or other] risks being run by regulatory inaction are in some way uncertain but
non-negligible, regulatory inaction is unjustified”.
9
As Cameron argues these definitions lead one to three key questions in the
debate of what constitutes the precautionary principle:
§  How does one determine whether non-negligible risk exists and its extent?
§  Assuming this is possible what regulatory action is justified? and
§  How should the thresholds for risk and costs of non-action be determined, in
other words who makes the decisions?
3.1 Determining Non-Negligible Risk
There is inevitably a spectrum of risk assessment. At the one (environmental) end
of the spectrum, there is non-negligible risk in all cases, since new products of
processes will always have some impact. At the other end of the spectrum non-
negligible risk is heavily qualified by benefits and action constrained by the
potential costs in terms of lost production and economic benefits. Clearly a
definition which includes everything in non-negligible risk is not much help. The
position adopted by, for example, the European Commission in its 2000 paper
on the precautionary principle falls between these two extreme positions. The
Commission’s paper is discussed below.
Risk can be seen as consisting of two elements: the probability that an event will
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occur and the seriousness of that event for the environment and human health.
For example, one could postulate that the probability of a major nuclear accident
resulting in the release of significant levels of radioactive material is lower than a
road accident involving a petrol taker in which petrol is spilt leading to pollution
of water courses by carcinogenic benzene in the petrol. The nuclear accident
would however be much more serious and affect far more people than a localised
spill of petrol. 
10 Thus, whilst science may be able to develop some theories on
the probability of an event, it may not be able to assess the seriousness of the
impact, which will be shaped by other factors such as how close the tanker crash
is to a water source and whether that water source is important in public water
supply. Alternatively scientific uncertainty may be present in the calculation of the
probability of an event whilst the seriousness may be more easy to predict. There
may of course be uncertainty with regard to both elements.
In the literature and debate on risk, there is a general distinction between  risk
assessment, risk management and risk communication. Science-based
approaches have tended to be given greater emphasis in risk assessment even if
other social or environmental factors figure more in risk management. The work
of the Codex Alimentarius on Principles of Risk analyses this distinction between
risk assessment, risk management and risk communication. The European
Commission employs this approach in its 2000 paper on the precautionary
principle, and envisages that precaution has greater application in risk
management than risk assessment.
11 It has also been argued that one of the major
differences between the US approach and the European approach to risk is that
whilst both approaches provide a central role for science in risk assessment, the
US also uses sound science as the basis for risk management, whereas the EU
does not.
12 Such a distinction is helpful as a broad generalisation only since the
distinctions between risk assessment, management and communication are less
clear cut in practice.
13
                                                                
10 This is not an especially good example since there is scientific evidence that both nuclear leaks and
benzene represent a risk. The issue involved here is therefore prevention of dangerous levels of
exposure rather than precaution in the fact of uncertainty.
11 European Commission, Communication from the European Commission on the Precautionary
Principle, 2000, p. 10.
12 Grant Isaac, Regulatory regionalism in transatlantic trade relations: The case of agricultural
biotechnology, PhD dissertation, London School of Economics, February 2001.
13 Risk communication is concerned with transparency and with an interactive dialogue between
those responsible for risk analysis (assessment and management) and stakeholders (i.e. consumers,
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In practice, rules such as those of the WTO provide for provisional
precautionary measures to be taken while further research is undertaken in order
to be able to make a comprehensive assessment of risk. But before provisional
measures can be taken there must be an initial identification of risk. This raises
the particular difficulty of deciding what criteria should be used to make such
identification. Some would argue that such initial identification of risk should use
scientific knowledge. The proponents of precaution argue that this is inadequate.
3.2 Deciding on What Action Should Be Taken
Assuming it is possible for risk assessment to determine that non-negligible risk
exists, how does one decide on the degree of regulatory intervention? Again it is
possible to define a spectrum of possible policy objectives to guide decision-
makers. This spectrum ranges from avoidance of irreversible harm [to the
environment] to action to protect the environment regardless of the worth of any
product or process to mankind. If the latter policy objective were chosen, it
would require a higher degree of precaution or tough regulation aimed at
significantly constraining the production of the product concerned or quite
possibly an outright ban. If irreversible harm is selected as the policy objective,
then it is possible to envisage lower levels of precaution and a greater use of
cost-benefit analysis. For example, in the examples of German and British policy
on acid rain discussed above, Germany pursued a higher level of precaution than
the British.
Broadly speaking therefore the precautionary principle says that where there is
uncertainty, there is a high cost of inaction. As with the risk assessment,
however, there are dangers associated with high levels of precaution. There could
be high economic costs of regulatory intervention, which might, for example,
undermine the competitive position of the European industry compared with
producers elsewhere. There may also be high political and economic costs, for
example, in the interruption of trade relations between the EU and US through the
introduction of high degrees of precaution in the regulation of genetically
modified foods. There may also be political costs in high degrees of precaution
in the sense that if these are not born out by subsequent experience and
reasonably definite scientific conclusions, risk managers may be embarrassed
and thus less likely to apply the precautionary principle in the future. In other
words, “crying wolf” or appearing to overreact to a potential risk may undermine
the credibility of the precautionary principle. Decision-makers might then be more
reticent about acting in the future when there is a genuine need to act. Against
these points it is argued that the absence of harm to the environment or human
health does not negate the value of precaution.
If measures are thought necessary, there is also the question of how long theySTEPHEN WOOLCOCK
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should be used. In other words should measures be time-limited, subject to
review after a specified period. Or must the duration of any provisional
precautionary measure depend on the particular characteristics of the case in
hand and the difficulties in gaining sufficient scientific evidence?
3.3 How to Set the Thresholds for Risk and Costs of Non-Action
Under the precautionary principle as applied in Europe, science does not have all
the answers; therefore, thresholds must inevitably be set in a  political process.
The precautionary principle thus legitimises public institutions to take decisions.
This does not mean that science is not important. As the European Commission
paper on the precautionary principle stresses, science is essential in risk
assessment and every avenue must be pursued in the search of firm scientific
evidence. But science may have no answers to offer, or may have only
conditioned answers. Scientific analysis requires data that may not be available or
is unreliable. It is also argued that scientific judgements inevitably contain
subjective value judgements of what constitute harm or damage to health or the
environment, so that scientific processes have to be subject to appropriate public
appraisal. As noted above, there is today a high level of mistrust of the suitability
of conventional forms of democratic accountability to provide this appraisal.
In other words, when it comes to the question of how decisions are taken in the
application of the precautionary principle, the final decisions on thresholds and
the costs of non-action are taken in a political process, not simply by accepting
the view of science. Furthermore in the current climate of disaffection with the
ability of conventional channels of democratic decision-making to make such
decisions, there is pressure for direct inclusion of civil society. The position in
the United States can be contrasted with that in Europe in the sense that the
findings of the science-based risk assessment tend to play a decisive role in risk-
management decisions. There is also more consumer confidence in this approach
in the US than in Europe.
3.4 Equity
To accept that decisions on risk thresholds are subjective and determined by
political processes means that judgement will inevitably vary from location to
location. For example, a developing country may place more emphasis on
economic growth and less on environmental damage or potential health risks than
a developed economy with high  per capita incomes. The application of the
precautionary principle therefore raise questions concerning how the costs of, for
example, pollution abatement should be shared.
The application of the precautionary principle therefore appears to call for aTHE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
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greater level of international  cooperation, including means of ensuring that the
costs of environmental protection are shared, than under a regime in which
“objective” science determined policy. These equity considerations add to the
pressure to deal with environmental issues on a regional or global level because
of the existence of physical externalities (i.e. cross-border pollution or global
commons issues).
3.5 The Burden of Proof
Under conventional environmental law and regulation the burden of proof tends
to be placed upon those who seek to regulate or prohibit a product or process,
because they believe their health or the environment is being damaged. This is
often a significant hurdle, especially when assessments of harm of damage are
based on scientific evidence. If there is no scientific evidence of damage, then
one cannot prove the need for regulation. But scientific evidence is expensive to
obtain and producers often control access to the necessary data.
14 This is not the
case in medicines, where the producers of new active substances must prove
they are both effective and safe from adverse side effects. Food safety regulation
comes somewhere in between these two ends of the spectrum.
The precautionary principle eases the burden of proof on those seeking to
impose controls. If there is no need to prove scientifically that there is a non-
negligible risk that a product or process damages health or the environment, then
it is easier to make the case for regulation. Indeed, if high levels of precaution are
envisaged in legislation; it may reverse the burden of proof, placing it upon those
seeking to introduce new processes or products.
4. The Application of the Precautionary Principle by the European
Union
So far this paper has discussed the elements of the precautionary principle in
general terms. This section looks at how the EU has applied the principle and in
particular how the application of the precautionary principle in the EU is likely to
impact upon the EU’s trading partners.
The precautionary principle is now an integral part of European policy with
regard to the environment and other policy areas such as food safety. As noted
above the precautionary principle is now anchored in the Treaty (on European
Union) (Art. 174):
Article 174(2) Community policy on the environment shall aim at a high
                                                                
14 The position with drugs and food additives is that companies seeking to introduce new products
have to show that these are safe.STEPHEN WOOLCOCK
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level of protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the
various regions of the Community. It shall be based on the
Precautionary Principle and on the principles that preventive action
should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be
rectified at source and that the polluter pays.
Despite the fact that the reference to the precautionary principle appears in the
article of the treaty dealing with Community environmental policy, the
precautionary approach has been interpreted as being applicable to other areas of
policy, such as food safety, health and safety. This interpretation relies in part on
Art. 6 of the treaty, which states:
Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the
definition and implementation of the Community policies and activities
referred to in Article 3 [the creation of a customs union and single
market] in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development.
In its ruling in the joined BSE cases (C-157/96 and C-180/96), brought by the
British government to challenge the implementation of a ban on British beef by
the European Commission on the grounds that the sale of beef still constituted a
risk to health despite the regulatory measures adopted by the British, the ECJ
ruled that the precautionary principle does not just apply to environmental
legislation but also measures aimed at protecting human health. In the BSE case,
the ECJ also confirmed that the precautionary principle can be used as grounds
for banning the sale of a product:
Where there is uncertainty as to the existence or extent of risks to
human health [the British government naturally argued that measures
introduced in the UK were sufficient to ensure food safety], the
institutions may take protective measures without having to wait until
the reality and seriousness of the risk become fully apparent.
This position by the ECJ has been subsequently confirmed in a number of
decisions of the Court of First Instance (the preliminary court which deals with
more straight forward cases in order to ease the burden on the European Court
of Justice). This was the shown in  cases T-70/99 and T-199/96, which also
confirmed that the precautionary principle could be used to protect consumer
health. The latter of these cases confirmed the view that health takes precedence
over economic considerations. The European Commission has also applied the
precautionary principle in its White Paper and draft legislation on food law, aTHE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
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position that is fully supported by the European Parliament.
15
There would therefore appear little doubt that the precautionary principle has
been established as an integral part of EU regulatory policy. The question that
remains, is how has it been applied to date and how will it be applied in the
future? With regard to this paper it is also important to ask how the principle will
be applied in instances where other countries will be affected, such as in the
application of the precautionary principle in cases that have an important bearing
on market access to the EU. The EU policy on the application of the
precautionary principle in regional or multilateral agreements will also be of
considerable importance to the EU’s main negotiating partners. Is the
precautionary principle the basis for a balanced approach to EU policy that
promotes sustainability and facilitates the growth of trade and investment? Or is it
an arbitrary concept that is wheeled out to justify controls that are dictated by
commercial or political expediency?
4.1 The Application of the Precautionary Principle in EU Trade Policy
Most of the concern about the use of the precautionary principle in the EU is
based on a number of trade disputes involving the United States. These include,
in particular, the beef hormones case, which went before the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) dispute settlement, the action by a number of EU member
states and the EU on the sale of genetically modified products, and the EU ban
on the use of certain antibiotics in animal feed as growth promoters.
Without going into these in any great depth, it is reasonable to say that these
cases do not reflect the balanced and consider application of the precautionary
principle in the EU. The beef hormone case concerns a ban imposed in 1988,
before the EU got very far in applying the precautionary principle. US  beef
exporters believed that the EU ban was arbitrary and had protectionist intent,
because US beef had been found to be safe in the US, on the basis of a sound
science test. But the US could not challenge the EU ban until the introduction of
the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures in 1995. Existing
GATT provisions under Art. XX provided considerable discretion for the EU to
ban without any ruling from the GATT. The SPS Agreement, as will be
discussed below, provides for precaution in so far as it allows for temporary
controls or bans when scientific evidence is inadequate (Art. 5(7) SPS). The EU
ban was however  a permanent ban, so it could not benefit from the SPS
provisions on precaution. The rest of the SPS agreement is geared to science-
                                                                
15 See European Commission, White Paper on General principles of Food law in the European
Union, COM 99 719 final.STEPHEN WOOLCOCK
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based risk assessment including reference to (science-based) standards set by
the relevant international standards bodies, such as the Codex  Alimentarius. In
other words rules and thinking on precaution have evolved considerably since the
EU ban on beef hormones. Reference to the precautionary principle in the case
of the beef  hormones ban could therefore be seen as a means of justifying a
policy that was at odds with existing WTO rules, but which was in place when
the WTO rules were changed.
The same might be said for the case of genetically modified products. A 1990
Directive by the EU laid down provisions concerning GM products, including
elements of precaution, but this was adopted before public awareness and
suspicion of traditional methods of risk assessment had been aroused by such
cases as BSE. Approvals began under the 1990 Directive, but strong reaction
from consumers and environmental organisations led to national governments
taking unilateral action that was inconsistent with the EU rules. As the action of
EU member states is at odds with EU law, it is difficult to say that they are
consistent with a balanced European approach to precaution.
4.2 The European Commission’s Paper
What of future EU application of the precautionary principle? In February 2000
the European Commission produced a position paper on the precautionary
principle, setting out how it envisages the principle being applied. This was
produced with the participation of all Directorates General of the Commission,
including those concerned with environmental and consumer affairs, as well as
those concerned with industry and trade. At the time of publication the paper was
presented as merely a contribution to the ongoing debate on the application of
the precautionary principle within the EU in all policy areas. The Commission’s
paper has, however, been subsequently endorsed in a Resolution of the EU
Heads of State and Government at the June 2001 European Council and the
European Parliament.
The Commission paper argues that the EU, like other members of the WTO, has
the right to set standards of protection for the environmental and human animal
and plant health at the levels it wishes. This is dictated by the EU treaty
provisions which require the EU to develop high standards of environmental and
consumer protection. The EU is not just about opening markets; it also has
objectives in social and environmental policies. At the same time the Commission
seeks in its paper to develop an approach to precaution that will avoid recourse
to the precautionary principle as a disguised form of protectionism.
The Commission approach breaks down the process of dealing with risk into
various phases. First of all it presumes that potential hazards are identified in newTHE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
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projects or processes. Following this there is the division between risk
assessment risk management and risk communication.
4.3 Risk Assessment
A science-based approach is seen as central to the risk assessment stage. The
Commission argues that scientific investigation including the use of statistical
data to assess probability provides the essential base for dealing with risk. Risk
assessment is broken down into four stages:
1.  Hazard identification which means identifying the biological, chemical or
physical agents that may have adverse effects, such as through observation of
damage to health or the environment
2.  Hazard characterisation, which seeks to establish the causal relationship
between the use or release of the products concerned and harm;
3.  Appraisal of exposure, which is the evaluation of the probability of exposure
to the product under investigation; and
4.  Risk characterisation, which is the (quantitative or qualitative) estimation of
the probability and severity of any adverse effects.
It stresses, however, that where scientific uncertainty exists, the exact nature of
this uncertainty should be made clear to policy-makers that have the
responsibility of making decisions. If scientific evidence shows reasonable
grounds for concern, then normal preventative measures should be taken to
reduce risks. In other words, the Commission supports the use of a prudential
approach for dealing with known risks. Where scientific knowledge is
inadequate, there should be research commissioned in order to help fill gaps. The
EU has also initiated work in the European Scientific Technology Observatory on
the concept of scientific uncertainty in order to better understand the nature of
scientific methods. In other words the Commission sees science as playing an
essential role in dealing with risk. The EU approach to precaution is not anti-
science.
4.4 Risk Management
Whilst science has its proper role, the Commission paper stresses that judging
what is and what is not an acceptable risk for society is an “eminently political
responsibility”. In other words when it comes to risk management, science
cannot be expected to able to make judgements on what is and what is not an
acceptable risk, especially when there is a lack of scientific certainty.
In terms of what action should be taken to deal with risk, the Commission
stresses that taking no action forms part of a logical approach to theSTEPHEN WOOLCOCK
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precautionary principle. Nor need the action when taken, always be in the form of
legally binding measures or Directives in the case of the EU. The suitable course
of action may be to commission further research into the effects of the product
or process, or simply to inform the public of the potential risk from use of the
product. If legislation is required this will in the EU be subject to review by the
European Court of Justice. The ECJ can also review and rule on any act of the
EU institutions, including recommendations or other measures short of
proposing legislation. The Commission sees this as a guarantee against arbitrary
decisions.
4.5 Guidelines for Regulatory Measures
The Commission paper sets out a number of guidelines for measures taken on
the basis of the precautionary principle. These draw on existing guidelines found
in EU law and practice as well as in international trade rules. Generally these
guidelines seek to limit the danger of the abuse of discretionary policy decisions.
These principles are:
§  Proportionality. Any measure should not be out of proportion to the risk
entailed and should not aim at zero risk. At the same time the Commission
argues that whilst the ban on the use of a product may not be proportionate,
there may in certain cases be not alternative. The Commission also stresses
that proportionality must take account of long term developments and should
not, for example, result in risks being shifted onto future generations. Here the
Commission appears to wish to aim for a point somewhere in the middle of
the spectrum between a total ban and inaction, but the wording provides
scope for total bans all the same.
§  Less restrictive measures. When selecting the level of regulatory intervention
less restrictive measures (than prohibition) should be given consideration, for
example, reductions in exposure, tighter controls, provisional limits,
replacement with alternative products or (non binding) recommendations. The
“less trade restrictive” wording is a little unclear here and is weaker than the
use of the “least trade restrictive measure” favoured in trade agreements.
§  Non-discrimination. In line with standard EU and international economic law
it is proposed that any measure should be non-discriminatory. In other words
products should be treated the same regardless of their “geographical origin”.
But the Commission paper clearly does not mean that any measure should
respect national treatment for like products as set out in the WTO rules.
§  Consistency. When measures are taken to deal with risk with regard to one
product or policy area these should whenever possible be consistent with
policies pursued in other cases. Such consistency will reduce the degree ofTHE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
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uncertainty for producers and make regulation or action more predictable.
Here as in other respects the Commission paper follows the SPS agreement,
which calls for consistency.
§  Benefits and costs of action. Before taking any action there should be a cost-
benefit analysis covering both economic and non-economic factors as well as
both long and short term costs ad benefits. The efficacy of different options
for action should also be considered, so that other things being equal the
most effective measures are taken. But as the treaty states, health takes
precedence over economic considerations.
§  Continued examination of scientific developments. The life of any measure
should be determined by the status of scientific knowledge. In other words if
science is able to clarify risk or show that risk is less than was originally
anticipated, then the measure should be modified or revoked. The
Commission seems to argue that it is inappropriate to place time limits on any
action. This is again in line with the SPS agreement. However the later
includes reference to the need for scientific justification for a measure being
found within a reasonable period of time.
4.6 Burden of Proof
The Commission paper also addresses the question of burden of proof, pointing
out that under existing practice for drugs, pesticides and food additives, prior
approval is required. This means that the burden of proof is on those wishing to
introduce the new products to show that they do not risk harming consumers or
the environment. This means that is it business that must pay for the collection of
scientific evidence.
For other products or in other cases, consumers, individuals or public authorities
have to fund research if they wish to prove that the product is not safe. The
Commission clearly entertains the view that there should be an easing of the
burden of proof on consumers or environmental lobbies wishing to prove that a
product is not safe. The introduction of a degree of precaution would, of course,
have this effect.
4.7 Assessment
It is fair to say that the EU to date has not been especially consistent in its
application of the precautionary principle to issues concerning international trade,
such as in the food safety cases. The lack of a developed body on principles
with regard to the application of the precautionary principle to certain policy
areas has made it possible to argue that the EU is simply using precaution as a
means of justifying what are in fact decisions based on political or commercialSTEPHEN WOOLCOCK
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expediency.
The EU is therefore committed to the application of the precautionary principle.
One area in which this will be of considerable importance for the EU’s trading
partners is that of food safety.
4.8 The Application of Precaution in New EU Food Safety Provisions
The guidelines for the application of the precautionary principle discussed above
are general to all applications in the EU. As mentioned above, the EU’s
application of the precautionary principle was developed in the field of
environmental regulation. In recent years it has also found wider application in
food standards. One reason for this has been the shift in consumer views and
especially consumer confidence in the established, largely science based risk
analysis procedures, as a result of cases such as the BSE crisis. In order to
restore confidence in European food safety regulation, the EU is in the process
of a comprehensive restructuring of food safety legislation and regulatory
procedures. This restructuring was set out in a White Paper on Food Safety,
16
and was followed by draft implementing legislation, which is currently in the final
stages of being adopted by the EU member states and the European Parliament.
17
18
The revamped approach to food safety regulation in the EU uses the well
established distinction between risk assessment, which will be the responsibility
of the new European Food Authority in  cooperation with national regulatory
authorities, risk management, which will at EU level remain the responsibility of
the European institutions, namely the Council of Ministers and European
Parliament with some powers delegated to the European Commission, and risk
communication, where both the Commission and European Food Authority
appear to have a role.
European food safety regulation will continue to be based on scientific advice
that will be provided to the EU institutions by the European Food Authority. The
existing scientific committees that advised the EU policy-makers will be
                                                                
16 White Paper on Food Safety, Com (1999) 719 final.
17 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and Council laying down the general
principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Authority (EFA) and laying
down procedures in matters of food safety. Com (2000) 714 of November 2000.
18 The establishment of the European Food Authority was held up because it was one of a number of
new institutions, whose location had to be decided at the Laeken European Council in December
2001. The location of the EFA in Helsinki as was expected was frustrated by Italy which sought to
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integrated into the EFA and will come under the general guidance of a Scientific
Steering Committee of the EFA. One of the rationales for establishing the EFA
was that more research was needed at an EU level on food safety issues and
more effective scientific co-operation among national expert bodies (undertaken
within the Scoop), which the EFA will also promote. Research at the EU level is
also funded in the research frameworks.
The EU is therefore seeking to put more effort into strengthening the scientific
assessment of risk, but the EU approach as set out in the White Paper and
subsequent legislation, also provides for “other legitimate factors” to be taken
into account in the decision making process. These include, for example,
reference to the environment, animal welfare, sustainable agriculture and
consumer expectations. None of these factors could be expected to be covered
in any substantial fashion in conventional scientific assessment methods. Art. 7
of the Regulation laying down the general principles and requirements of
European food law (see above) states that the precautionary principle may be
used in risk management:
Art.  7 (1) In those specific circumstances where, following an
assessment of available pertinent information a risk to health is
identified but scientific uncertainty persists, provisional risk
management measures necessary to ensure the high level of health
protection chosen in the Community may be adopted, pending further
scientific information for a more comprehensive risk assessment.
Art.  7 (2) Measures adopted on the basis of paragraph 1 shall be
proportional and no more restrictive of trade than is required to
achieve the high level of health protection chosen by the Community,
regard being had to technical and economic feasibility and other
factors regarded as legitimate in the matter under consideration. The
measures shall be reviewed within a reasonable period of time,
depending on the nature of the risk to life or health identified and the
type of scientific information needed to clarify the scientific uncertainty
and to conduct a more comprehensive risk assessment.
The application of precaution here applies to intra-EU trade although the same
criteria are inevitably likely to be applied to imports into the EU. The EU
approach to food safety regulation therefore fully embraces the precautionary
principle and as such is in line with both public opinion in the EU as well as the
jurisprudence of the ECJ. Art. 7 (1) leaves a good deal of scope for non-
scientific factors to be considered, including in the initial identification of
possible risk. Both paragraphs stress that the European Community (EU) has
chosen high standards of protection for health and food safety. WhilstSTEPHEN WOOLCOCK
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precautionary measures are to be provisional, there is a good deal of discretion
with regard to the length of time needed to gather more scientific information.
This contrasts with the aims of some of the EU’s trading partners to set
reasonably tight time scales.
In addition to the wording of the Regulation, there is of course the guidelines on
interpretation of the precautionary principle set out in the Commission
communication of January 2000, and subsequently endorsed by the European
Council (in a resolution of Heads of State and Government in June 2001) and the
European Parliament.
The EU’s approach to precaution has been shaped by a range of factors.
Experience in the field of environmental regulation has been important as noted
above. There have also been some systematic studies of the use or non-use of
precaution in past cases of risk to the environment and health. For example, a
study of 12 cases of harm or potential harm to the environment and health over
the past century was undertaken by the European Environment Agency. The
conclusions reached in this study have to a large extent been incorporated into
EU policy. For example, the EEA study argues for the need for continuous
monitoring of the long-term effects of exposure to potentially harmful substances
and for research to help plug the gaps in knowledge. These approaches are
incorporated into the EU’s approach to food safety. The separation of
responsibilities for risk analysis and the regulation of a sector was a lesson that
was painfully learned in the case of BSE. The EEA study also points to the need
to acknowledge uncertainty in science and for “lay” (i.e. non-expert) inputs into
judgements of risk. These are core elements in the EU’s interpretation of the
precautionary principle as set out in the European Commission’s 2000 report.
19
                                                                
19 The full  list of recommendations from the European Environment Agency are as follows: 1)
Acknowledge and respond to ignorance, as well as uncertainty and risk, in technology appraisal and
public policy-making. 2) Provide adequate long-term environmental and health monitoring and
research into early warnings. 3) Identify and work to reduce blind spots and gaps in scientific
knowledge. 4) Identify and reduce interdisciplinary obstacles to learning. 5) Ensure that real world
conditions are adequately accounted for in regulatory appraisal. 6) Systematically scrutinise the
claimed justifications and benefits alongside the potential risks. 7) Evaluate a range of alternative
options for meeting needs alongside the option under appraisal, and promote more robust, diverse
and adaptable technologies so as to minimise the costs of surprises and maximise the benefits of
innovation. 8) Ensure use of “lay” and local knowledge, as well as relevant specialist expertise in the
appraisal. 9) Take full account of the assumptions and values of different social groups. 10) Maintain
regulatory independence from interested parties while retaining an inclusive approach to information
and opinion gathering. 11) Identify and reduce institutional obstacles to learning and action. 12)
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5. The Precautionary Principle in International Law
If the precautionary principle is finding application in the European Union, what
is the position in other countries, and what use is made of the principle in
bilateral, regional or multilateral agreements? This is an important question
because the widespread adoption of the principle in both practice and law could
have important implications for policy and trade relations. It would also suggest a
need for efforts to reach agreed interpretations of the principle.
5.1 The Precautionary Principle as part of the Body of International Law
Although the precautionary principle only emerged in international (environmental
agreements) agreements in the 1980s it has had a meteoric rise.
20 Surveys of the
application of the principle show a large and growing number of multilateral,
regional and bilateral agreements use it or the concepts embodied in the
precautionary principle. The first multilateral environment agreement to include
the concept was the 1985 Vienna Convention on Ozone Depleting Substances,
which included a reference to precaution in its preamble. At a regional level the
Ministerial Declaration of the Second International Conference on the Protection
of the North Sea stated that:
In order to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging effects of
the most dangerous substances, a precautionary approach is necessary
which may require action to control inputs of such substances even
before a causal link has been established by absolutely clear scientific
evidence.
21
The Bergen Declaration of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
on sustainable development is another clear expression of the principle in a
European agreement. This states:
In order to achieve sustainable development policies must be based on
the precautionary principle. Environmental measures must anticipate,
prevent and attack the causes of environmental degradation. Where
there are threat of serious irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to
prevent environmental degradation.
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
for concern. See European Environment Agency, Late lessons from early warnings: The
precautionary principle 1896-2000, Environmental Issue Report No. 22, Earthscan Publications,
2002.
20 James Cameron, “The precautionary principle in international law”, in O’Riordan et al. (2001).
21 Quoted in European Commission (2000), Annex II.STEPHEN WOOLCOCK
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Regional or bilateral agreements outside of Europe have also made use of the
concept of precaution even if they did not make explicit reference to a
precautionary principle, e.g. agreements between the US and Canada on water
quality in the Great Lakes.
Multilateral agreements on the environment ( MEAs) soon picked up and
employed the same sort of wording. Probably the most significant step was in
the Rio Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED) which states in Principle 15 that:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach should
be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there
are threats of serious irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental degradation.
Similar provisions were included in the preamble of the Convention Biodiversity
of 1992 and in the principles of the Convention on Climate Change of 1992.
Furthermore aspects of precaution can now be found in the rules governing
international trade, such as in the Agreement on Sanitary and  Phytosanitary
Measures of the WTO and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety which regulates
trade in living modified organisms ( LMOs) (or biotech products), see below.
This has provoked a debate on whether the precautionary principle has now
become part of the body of international environmental law or indeed an aspect
of customary law. The significance of the latter is that when a principle becomes
part of customary international law is may be applied in the interpretation of any
relevant international agreement even if the parties to that agreement have not
explicitly committed themselves to applying the principle.
5.2 The Precautionary Principle as Customary Law
In his discussion of the role of the precautionary principle in international law,
Cameron argues that the precautionary principle, because of its widespread
application in international environmental and trade agreements, does indeed form
part of the body of international environmental law and that a good case can be
made for it being treated as customary law.
22 Cameron uses the application of the
precautionary principle in this range of agreements, as well as case law, as
grounds for arguing that precaution is burgeoning towards becoming part of
customary international law. The case law also comes from the international and
regional levels. For example, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
                                                                
22 See James Cameron, “The Precautionary Principle in International Law”, in  O’Riordan et al.
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applied the precautionary principle in the bluefin tuna case. This case involved a
claim by Australia and New Zealand that on the grounds of precaution, unilateral
experimental fishing of  bluefin tuna by Japan was inconsistent with Japan’s
obligations under the Law of the Sea.
At a regional level the European Court of Justice has accepted precaution as
grounds for allowing trade restrictions under Art. 36 EEC, i.e. on trade within the
EU. For example, in the Danish brown bee case, which involved a ban on the
importation of a non-native species of bee to the Laeso Island in Denmark, it was
argued by Denmark that this would threaten the native Laeso brown bee. 
23 There
was no scientific proof that the native bee would be threatened, but the ECJ
accepted the case for a ban based on precaution:
Cameron also argues that all these applications of the precautionary principle
have a number of common elements, namely that they are all based on the
recognition that: a) regulatory non-action threatens to lead to non-negligible harm;
b) a lack of certainty as to the cause and effects relationship exists; and that c)
under such circumstances, regulatory in-action is unjustified. The widespread
application of these common principles therefore enables a case to be made that
the precautionary principle is customary international law.
Such legal arguments are likely to become more important in the future, but for
the moment the issue is still undecided. Indeed, in the beef hormones case the
Appellate Body of the WTO did not accept the argument of the European
Community, supported by the World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF), that the
precautionary principle was part of customary law and should therefore be
accepted as grounds for limiting imports of beef containing growth hormones.
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6. The Precautionary Principle and Trade Relations
6.1 The WTO
The preamble to the WTO contains a reference to the objectives of the
organisation that includes “sustainability”, although this is included in a range of
objectives including expanding the production and trade in goods and services.
This has been used by proponents of the principle to argue that WTO rules
should be modified to allow for a greater degree of precaution than is currently
the case.
Perhaps the most important part of the WTO with regard to recent actions
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involving the precautionary principle has been the Agreement on the Application
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS agreement) adopted with the WTO
in 1995. The SPS agreement allows Member governments of the WTO to take
SPS measures provided the measures taken are “based on scientific principles”
(Art. 2 (2) SPS). As noted above the approach of the SPS agreement is squarely
science based, except:
where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, [when] a Member
[government] may  provisionally [emphasis added] adopt sanitary or
phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent information,
including that from the relevant international organisations as well as
from the sanitary and  phytosanitary measures applied by other
members. In such circumstances Members shall seek to obtain the
additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of
the risk and review the sanitary or  phytosanitary measure according
within a reasonable period of time (Art. 5(7) SPS).
It is this Art. 5 (7) which, according to the Appellate Body of the WTO [in the
beef  hormones case] contains elements of the precautionary principle. Having
said this there remains considerable scope for ambiguity in the agreement. For
example, does the reference to information from relevant international
organisation mean that the safety of a product that conforms with Codex
Alimentarius standards, as the US beef does, is not uncertain? Equally, does the
reference to “measures applied by other members” mean that if other countries
find the product safe there cannot be scientific uncertainty surrounding the
product?
The SPS agreement contains a list of the factors that should be taken into
account when assessing risk including: scientific evidence; relevant inspection
techniques, sampling and testing methods; prevalence of specific diseases or
pests; relevant ecological or environmental conditions etc. It is not clear whether
this is an exclusive list. Art. 5(2) SPS calls for an evaluation of the costs of any
SPS measuring, including loss of production to be considered in assessing risk.
Art. 5(4) calls for measures that “minimise the effects on trade” and Art. 5(6) the
use of SPS measures that are not more trade-restrictive than required to achieve
“the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection”. So Art. 5(7) must
be seen in the context of this generally much more restrictive set of conditions on
the use of SPS measures to limit trade.
A key test case in the interpretation of the SPS agreement with regard to the
interpretation of Art. 5  was the beef hormones case. As noted above the EU
argued that the precautionary principle was customary international law and
should therefore be applied in the WTO and specifically in the SPS agreement.THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
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This case was made in part because of the general weakness of the EU’s case
under the SPS agreement, but it reflects the EU’s policy on the role of the
precautionary principle as an instrument with very wide application. As pointed
out above, Art. 5 (7) allows for provisional measures to be taken when there is
inadequate scientific knowledge. In the case of the EU ban on growth hormones
in beef, the ban was permanent and had not been based on any systematic
scientific risk assessment. The US was therefore able to argue that the SPS
agreement provides for action when there is insufficient evidence, but that the EU
ban was neither provisional nor based on any scientific assessments.
Regardless of the substance of the case, the beef hormone case is interesting in
the sense that the Appellate Body did find some evidence that Art. 5 (7) contains
elements of a precautionary. The discussion on the elements of the precautionary
principle would indeed appear to support this position.
In the Australian Salmon case the Appellate Body of the WTO interpreted other
articles of the SPS agreement, including Art. 5(2) on what is involved in risk
assessment. This case involved an Australian ban on the importation of fresh
salmon from Canada on the grounds that this could result in the entry of certain
pests present in Canada. Here the Appellate Body found that this included
identification of the potential pest, the likelihood of the pest entering a country in
the absence of SPS measures, as well as the likelihood of this being prevented
with SPS measures in place, in other words the effectiveness. A comparison of
these elements with the discussion of what constitutes the precautionary principle
above again shows that there are clearly common elements.
In the Japanese apples case, which involved a US complaint against Japan on the
testing of different varieties of apple, the Appellate Body also began to define
what constitutes “sufficient” scientific evidence and in particular the nature of the
link between scientific evidence and a specific SPS measure. For example,
general scientific data may not be sufficient to justify SPS measures when the
impact of a pest may vary between varieties of a product.
This discussion of the current interpretation of the SPS agreement suggests that it
does provide scope for some degree of precaution. At the moment however
there is no consensus between the major WTO Members on this issue. The EU
favours the application of precaution, as illustrated in the Commission’s
Communication of February 2000.
25 The US position, at least that of the federal
government, is that science-based approaches should determine risk assessment
and much of risk management. The US sees the EU approach to precautionary
                                                                
25 The Commission argues that its approach is consistent with the SPS Agreement. There are areas,
however, where this is likely to be challenged.STEPHEN WOOLCOCK
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principle as a cover for arbitrary decisions, especially given that the EU stresses
the role of political decisions. The US views such political decisions that are not
subject to due process as liable to capture by vested interests. Although the
WTO Appellate Body may have some scope to interpret the SPS provisions, it is
unlikely to wish to rule on an issue that remains one of considerable contention
between the two major WTO members.
In terms of trade relations the potential for a dispute over genetically modified
products is therefore the source of some concern. GM products are of much
greater economic significance in transatlantic and other trade than, for example,
beef. In the case of beef hormones there was an international standard developed
in the Codex  Alimentarius. As noted above this was determined by a largely
science based approach, which proponents of precaution would argue failed to
adequately account for societal concern of potential harm. In the case of
genetically modified products, however, there is no international standard.
Although a Codex committee has been working on the issue for some time, it is
still some way from reaching any agreement, for the reason that the parties to
discussions in the Codex are the same as those in the general debate about the
use of precaution with regard to GM products. With both sides firmly wedded to
their respective positions the scope for compromise is limited. Under these
conditions a ruling by the WTO on such a sensitive issue could be damaging to
the organisation and the trade regime in general, since it would undermine support
for the WTO in one of the major members.
In short a resolution to the differences over the use of precaution in the SPS
agreement will require some convergence between the existing EU and US
positions. A precondition of such a convergence is a clear understanding of what
is meant by precaution. This condition has not been satisfied to date, although
the European Commission paper has contributed to a clearer understanding of
the EU position.
6.2 The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement
Although of less direct concern to the application of the precautionary principle
the TBT agreement of the WTO is likely to be important for trade issues
concerning environmental and health issues. The TBT Agreement requires non-
discrimination between like products in the application of mandatory regulation
or labelling of health and safety issues, voluntary standards and conformance
assessment measures. As such it has been important in tackling a range of
technical barriers to trade, especially those in industry and manufacturing. The
TBT agreement envisages that Members of the WTO will wish to set different
standards of protection. So mandatory regulations can be adopted provided
these do not discriminate between like products.THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
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The like product clause creates a difficulty with regard to environmental issues in
that there is no scope for differentiation between products with regard to the
method of production. In short products produced in a non-sustainable fashion
must be treated the same way as products produced using sustainable methods
of production. With regard to the case of GM products the question that arises is
whether TBT Agreement allows for discrimination between “natural” or non-GM
products and GM products that are  substantially equivalent to non-GM
products.
26
One means of dealing with differences between the standards of protection and
precaution between countries is to provide labels, so that consumers know what
they are buying and can exercise their right practice “sustainable consumption”.
In other words they can freely choose not to buy products that originate from
GM crops.
27 There are a number of difficulties with this apparently elegant
solution. As it stands the TBT agreement prohibits mandatory labelling schemes
which discriminate between products according to how they are produced. Thus
the proposed EU mandatory-labelling scheme for GM products could be at odds
with the TBT Agreement. Voluntary labelling schemes are not subject to binding
TBT disciplines. Voluntary schemes are covered by a non-binding Code of
Conduct for voluntary standards and labelling bodies. But European consumers
do not appear to be satisfied with voluntary labelling schemes. They want
something that has the force of law and can thus be properly enforced. There is
also some lack of clarity over whether public but voluntary schemes, such as the
eco-labelling schemes developed in a number of European countries (such as the
Blue Angel in Germany and the White Swan in Sweden) are subject to TBT
disciplines or not. Some exporting countries consider that they should be subject
to full TBT disciplines. The EU has sought to include clarification of this and
other elements of the TBT and SPS agreements in the WTO as part of any future
multilateral trade round.
6.3 The Bio-Safety Convention
The 1992 Convention of Biodiversity called for the establishment of  biosafety-
related regulations to deal with the risks to biodiversity associated with the release
                                                                
26 The WTO treats products as like products unless differences in production or processing methods
are embodied in the product itself. This raises the question of whether GM products, such as GM
soya oil is chemically different from non-GM soya oil. If it is not, then the TBT agreement prohibits
any measure that discriminates between the GM and non GM oil.
27 Labelling can be very effective. Even without a formal labelling regime for GM based products,
consumer preferences have had a real impact on the willingness of North American farmers to plant
GM crops for fear that these will not find export markets in Europe.STEPHEN WOOLCOCK
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of living modified organisms ( LMOs) resulting from biotechnology. In March
2001 the Cartagena Protocol on Bio-safety was adopted under the auspices of
the Convention on Bio Diversity. As noted above the  Cartagena Protocol
provides for the application of the precautionary principle, despite the resistance
to this from the so-called Miami group of countries exporting that have high
percentages of GM crops and LMOs in their agricultural exports.
The centrepiece of the Bio-safety protocol is the system of Advanced Informed
Agreement Procedure in which importing countries are informed in advance of
the arrival of LMOs in any shipment. Under the Protocol states then have the
right to refuse to allow the importation of the  LMOs when, according to the
standards prevailing in the importing country, the LMO poses a threat to the bio
diversity of the country concerned. Two forms of LMOs are possible: one is the
form that will be released into the environment, such as when seeds or other
living organisms are imported, and LMOs in food. In the latter case, it is argued
that these pose no threat for the environment. As a result LMOs in food are not
subject the provisions of Advance Informed Agreement Procedure. Many
European consumers appear to feel strongly that there are also food safety issues
and have lobbied hard for at least labelling of products that originate from GM
crops.
The major issue for trade relations is, of course, that if each party to the
agreement has the right to deny access to imports on the basis of national
standards and the Protocol provides for the application of the precautionary
principle, does the Bio-safety Protocol prevail over the WTO provisions or vice
versa? The Bio-Safety Protocol provides for the application of a permanent ban
based on the precautionary principle, whereas the SPS agreement provides for a
much more restricted form of precaution for a transition period only.
There would seem to be a clear clash here between different international
agreements. Savings clauses were negotiated to address this issue, but these do
not resolve the long-term problem of one agreement adopting the precautionary
principle and the other (the WTO) not or only partially. The Bio-Safety Protocol
reads:
This Protocol shall not be interpreted as implying a change in the rights
and obligations of a party under an existing international agreement.
According to this sentence, the rights of the members under the WTO are not
affected. In other words the more science based provisions of the SPS and the
non-discrimination between like products under the TBT agreement prevail. In
the next paragraph of the Protocol however, it reads:
The above recital is not intended to subordinate this Protocol to otherTHE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
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international agreements.
which reads that the Bio-Safety Protocol prevails over the WTO.
28
The conclusion from these examples, of how the precautionary principle can
affect international trade and trade agreements, would appear to be that there is
no option but to find some consensus on the application of the precautionary
principle. The concept lies at the heart of differences in risk assessment and risk
management and thus differences over the interpretation of a number of key trade
and environment agreements.
6.4 Work in the Codex Alimentarius
The Codex  Alimentarius has played an important role in defining food safety
standards and as such played a decisive role in disputes such as the beef
hormone case. The Codex is also at the centre of efforts to find an agreed
interpretation or application of the precaution principle or a precautionary
approach in issues related to food safety and health.
29 In 2000 the Commission
of the Codex  Alimentarius considered a draft proposal on Codex Working
Principles for Risk Analysis. This was discussed in 2000 but without any
consensus being reached. One of the main reasons for a lack of consensus was
the inclusion in the draft of wording covering the use of precaution/the
precautionary principle. The aim of the new Working Principles was accepted by
all Codex members, namely that risk analysis in Codex should be aimed at
“protecting the health of consumers while at the sae time ensuring fair practices in
food trade”.
30 There was also agreement to consider the draft Working
Principles.
Differences were apparent from the beginning on the broad approach to risk
analysis. For example, the US argued for wording that would ensure that risk
analysis was “soundly based on science”, while the EU and Consumers
International, saw science as an important but not the only element in risk
                                                                
28 See Gary  Sampson, “Bio-technology and trade issues in the WTO”, paper presented at the
Seminar on European Trade Policies, Sweden Trade Council, Stockholm, 11 August 2001.
29 There is sensitivity about terminology here. Issues related to consumer health could be interpreted
to include environmental issues, which is what consumer organisations generally wish. A narrower
definition of food safety could help to maintain a distinction between the use of precaution in food
safety and the wider use of the precautionary principle in environmental regulation, which is what the
food industry and processors want.
30 For the draft Working Principles for Risk Analysis and the comments on the draft from various
national delegations and interested parties, see Report of the 24
th Session 2-7
th July 2001 of the
Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme.STEPHEN WOOLCOCK
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analysis. The Codex draft supported the distinction between three phases of risk
analysis: namely risk assessment, risk management and risk communication.
Broadly speaking there was also support for the view that risk assessment was
essentially science based and risk management could provide scope for other
legitimate factors to be considered. The 2000 draft stressed the need to separate
assessment and management in order to ensure the scientific integrity of the
assessment process. The debate on the draft showed, however, that clear-cut
distinctions were not possible and that assessment and management must be seen
as interactive. The provisions on risk communication stressed the need to have
effective communication with all interested parties. In subsequent discussions
this was clarified as including consumers, industry and the academic community.
The draft Working Principles reflected what appeared to be a broad consensus
on the three elements of risk analysis. For example, risk assessment should be
undertaken by independent assessors and suitable measures should be taken to
ensure their independence. Four steps in risk assessment were identified. These
were equivalent to those in the European Commission’s 2000 White Paper,
namely hazard identification, hazard characterisation, exposure assessment and
risk characterisation. Furthermore there seems to have been agreement that risk
assessment must specify areas of uncertainty and that these should be clearly
indicated to risk managers and interested parties.
According to the draft the responsibility for resolving the impact of uncertainty
lies with the risk manager and that guidelines should be developed for which
legitimate non-scientific factors should or can be included in risk management. It
is with regard to the coverage of precaution that agreement on the draft seemed
to cease. There were two alternative proposals included in the draft text (at para
34) on when precaution would be justified. The first paragraph was considered to
be broadly consistent with the wording of Art. 5(7) of the SPS Agreement in the
WTO and was therefore favoured by the national delegations from many
agricultural exporting countries as well as the food processing industry. The
second proposed paragraph sought to go somewhat beyond the SPS definition.
This stated:
Where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient to objectively and fully
assess risk from a hazard in food, and where there is reasonable
evidence to suggest that adverse effects on human health may occur,
but it is difficult to evaluate their nature and extent, it may be
appropriate for risk managers to apply precaution through interim
measures to protect the health of consumers without awaiting
additional scientific data and a full risk assessment.
The draft then went on to provide, in paragraph 35 a number of criteria relating toTHE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
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the decision to use precaution and the measures to be adopted that would help to
achieve the objective of protecting human health without restricting trade.
Paragraph 35 stated:
In such situations [as defined in para 34] the following criteria should be taken
into account to ensure the consistency and transparency of the decision process:
§  the decision to use precaution follows the identification of a ] specific risk is
identified in a preliminary risk assessment or evidence to support a risk exists,
but cause and extent are un-known due to gaps in scientific data;
§  [measures] should be proportional to the potential extent of risk based on
available scientific data;
§  [there should be a]transparent explanation of the need for measures to be
taken;
§  decisions [to apply precaution] should be consistent with those taken in
similar circumstances;
§  decisions should be provisional and subject to ongoing and transparent
review involving interested stakeholders;
§  information should continue to be gathered;
§  there should be an examination of the full range of options [including costs
benefit analysis] and the effectiveness of each measure, before action is taken.
Again the EU approach as set out in the 2000 Communication is consistent with
these criteria. It should be no surprise therefore that the EU endorsed the draft
Working Principles favouring the wording in para 34 (b) and that in para 35. The
United States made various proposals to modify the wording including, for
example, that the initial hazard identification should be by “available scientific
information”. This, of course, would place the emphasis on scientific evidence,
so that precaution would be applicable to the degree that the nature and extent of
the risk was uncertain. The US along with most other Codex delegations,
consumers and industry that provided comments on the draft broadly supported
para 35 as a step towards defining the criteria for the application of precaution,
but put cost benefit analysis at the top of the list rather than at the bottom.
Comments from various national delegations and interests illustrated that there
was still much scope for differences over the draft. For example, would it apply
to the Codex or to the application of risk analysis by governments/risk analysts,
should precautionary action be time limited; how should the vital preliminary risk
assessment be carried out and on what basis? Following submissions from the
various national delegations and interests work continued in a Working Party
chaired by France. This convened in December 2001 to consider a revised draftSTEPHEN WOOLCOCK
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and will meet again in April 2002. A range of differences separate the parties in
these discussions, but underlying these appears to be a broad distinction between
those who wish to see the precautionary principle applied in food safety (the
European union and consumer organisations) and those who wish to insulate
food safety regulation from the historical precedents set through the application
of the precautionary principle in environmental regulation (the US, other
agricultural exporters and the food processing industry). For the latter group the
WTO SPS Agreement provides a more attractive model, although it is
recognised that it would be useful to have agreed criteria on how to apply
precaution. This is especially the case with regard to the decision process to be
followed.
7. Conclusions
This paper leads to the following conclusions:
§  The precautionary principle has emerged as a philosophy on which to base
policy because: a) science has continued to produce new products and
processes but cannot prove with an degree of certainty that European
consumers find acceptable, that these products do not represent more than an
acceptable risk to the environment or human health; b) consumers and
environmental and other civil society  NGOs are seeking more sustainable
forms of production and consumption; and c) have become increasingly
sceptical of the ability of science and established channels of democratic
decision-making to decide what is an acceptable risk.
§  Europe has been the origin and main promoter of “the precautionary
principle” in the field of environmental regulation.
§  The precautionary principle has now been extended from environmental
regulation to include other areas of EU policy, such as in particular food
safety and has been anchored in the body of EU law and practice.
§  The precautionary principle (and perhaps “the precautionary principle”) has
also found application to some degree at least in a wide range of multilateral
and regional environment agreements as well as within the WTO, and
precaution is accepted in the Codex Alimentarius. Some form of precaution is
therefore here to stay.
§  Trade tensions can be expected to persist, however, because there remain
important ambiguities in international agreements concerning the degree of
precaution that can be used. There are clear conflicts between different
international agreements, such as the WTO and the Bio-Safety Convention.
There are also differences of view over whether it is appropriate or feasible to
use one precautionary principle for all policy areas. The EU tends to favourTHE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
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this approach, whereas the United States and others are resisting the
application of the precautionary principle as developed for environmental
policy to other policy areas, such as food safety.
§  The EU is pushing for the inclusion of “the precautionary principle” in the
interpretation of the WTO SPS Agreement and in the Codex work on
principles for risk analysis. At issue is not whether some form of precaution
will be included in the rules and guidelines emerging from these regimes, but
with what interpretation of precaution.
§  Some EU applications of the precautionary principle have been less than
coherent and have probably been shaped by political expediency. The EU has
now adopted a set of criteria to be used when applying the precautionary
principle, which are largely in line with the existing international norms that
exist.
§  Given the nature of international economic interdependence (globalisation)
and the linkages that exist between environmental and food safety issues, there
is a pressing need to develop more extensive criteria for the application of
precaution or the precautionary principle.
§  Risk varies from case to case so it is difficult to see how a single
comprehensive definition of precaution can be of much use. At issue is the
development of a set of procedural norms and principles that can be
employed to ensure that decisions taken in risk analysis, especially in risk
management, are transparent, proportionate or non-discriminatory and subject
to some form of review, to ensure that the discretion that is inevitably
associated with the application of precaution is not abused as a means of
trade protection.
8. An Agenda for Future Research
The issue of a precautionary approach or principle is central to a range of
important issues of considerable importance to the way international regimes
handle regulatory policy issues. There are ongoing debates in the WTO on the
interpretation and scope of application of the SPS Agreement. There are
discussions in the Codex Committees on Principles of Risk Analysis. There
remains an open clash between the Bio-Safety Protocol and the WTO and
between the WTO and other multilateral environmental agreements, such as the
Kyoto Protocol, which contain provisions on precaution. In all these issues the
role of the European Union will be crucial, because it is the main supporter of the
use of the precautionary principle.
Within Europe there are new regimes in the field of food safety and the regulation
of GMOs. How the EU evolves domestically will inevitably shape its position inSTEPHEN WOOLCOCK
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international negotiations. In order to fully understand the nature of the wider
international disputes, it is essential to have a full understanding of how the
“domestic” regulatory structures have evolved. In the case of the EU there is
therefore an opportunity to observe the reform of the regulatory structures.
The focus of future research should therefore be on how the structure of
European regulatory policy in the fields of the environment, food and consumer
protection is evolving. In particular it will be important to assess whether and if
so how the EU applies a uniform approach to precaution across all relevant
policy areas.
The EU process can not only shape international negotiations; it is also shaped
by them. There is clearly a good deal of synergy between the development of the
EU position on precaution in 2000 and the work in international fora, such as the
relevant Codex committees and the Codex Commission itself. It would therefore
be interesting to assess the interaction between the EU and international
processes.
Beyond this EU-focused approach, to research there remains much work on the
outstanding issues mentioned above. The highly technical and complex nature of
the issues makes it difficult for all but a few specialists to understand the nature
of the debates. This remains the case notwithstanding the genuine efforts by
governments to promote “transparency”. There is therefore a case to be made
for independent observation of the debates in bodies such as the Codex and the
publication of clearly written but competent assessments of the issues, so that a
wider constituency can understand the issues and the positions of the main
interests.THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE EU AND ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
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